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1The Computer Ate my Vote?
P Y A Ryan
Newcastle University
1.1 Introduction
Voting in the UK is largely conducted using the time-honoured process of
marking a paper ballot with a stubby pencil in the privacy of a little plywood
booth. Counting is by hand in the presence of various observers and it is
generally assumed that the process is reasonably trustworthy and that any
corruption or fraud is too insignificant to affect the outcome. As a result, we
have a tendency to take our democracy and elections for granted.
This complacency has been shaken in recent years by, amongst other
events, the problems with the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in the
US and, closer to home, trials in the UK of postal voting (absentee voting in
US parlance). The latter revealed evidence of corruption sufficiently serious to
result in prosecution of a number of councillors. The election procedures em-
ployed were described by one of the investigating judges as “sufficiently bad to
disgrace a minor banana republic”. A recent poll by market researchers, Ipsos,
indicated that 19% of the UK electorate distrusts the UK electoral system.
We see that, in reality, this democracy that we tend to take for granted is a
fragile and precious attribute of civilisation. From the dawn of democracy the
Ancient Greeks recognised that people would attempt to corrupt the outcome
of elections and used primitive but ingenious technological devices to shift the
trust away from people, i.e. officials, to mechanical devices - see for example
“Ancient Greek Gadgets and Machine” by Grumbaugh [18].
In the US various technologies for voting have been deployed for over a
century, starting with lever machines in 1897, followed by punch cards, optical
scanners, touch screens etc. Interestingly, these innovations appear to have
been largely prompted by high occurrence of fraud with paper ballots. The
? Chapter to appear in “Formal Methods: State of the Art and New Directions”,
edited by P.P. Boca, J.P. Bowen J.I. Siddiqi to be published by Springer in 2007
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excellent book by Gumbel, “Steal this Vote” [19], documents an extraordinary
litany of instances of corruption and ingenious techniques to corrupt every
voting system that has ever been deployed in the US. Recent reports, like the
Johns Hopkins report, [26] and more recently the Princeton report [15], on the
Diebold touch screen devices, demonstrate how vulnerable a poorly designed
electronic voting system is to virtually undetectable corruption.
Against this backdrop, one might reasonably ask: why not just stick with
the tried and tested pencil and paper? This reaction has much to commend
it: there do appear to be good grounds to believe that to pull off large scale,
undetected fraud would be difficult. The fact that anyone can apply to be an
observer during the parts of the process gives some degree of transparency. The
current UK system is certainly not perfect but it does appear to quite robust
and commands a reasonable degree of confidence. It does have weaknesses and
requires significant levels of trust in the officials and processes.
Sticking with the traditional techniques for conducting elections appears
not to be an option. There is pressure, mainly from politicians, for the adop-
tion of electronic means for various stages in the processing of votes, appar-
ently in the belief that the convenience of remote, e.g.: internet, phone voting,
etc. will encourage higher participation. It is argued that the use of touch
screens may help guide voters through the more complex, multi-race ballots
presented to voters, as with many US elections. Appropriate use of technol-
ogy may enable voters with disabilities to vote in privacy. Electronic counting
potentially could help with speed, accuracy and efficiency. There seems also
to be a sentiment that continuing to use 18th century methods in the 21st
century feels a little archaic and unworthy of a modern democracy.
There are thus numerous reasons to explore more technologically advanced
voting systems. For a cryptographer, the most compelling reason to explore
alternative approaches, aside from the intellectual challenges, is the potential
to create schemes that will provide far greater levels of assurance of accuracy
and ballot secrecy whilst removing the need to trust suppliers, software or
officials. Schemes like those described below may provide a sound basis on
which to restore faith in the mechanisms of democracy. These schemes can be
thought of as striving to place democracy on the firm foundations of mathe-
matics. I think that the Ancient Greeks would have looked favourably on such
an endeavour!
The material presented here is based on previously published material at
[35, 8, 38, 36].
1.2 The Challenge
The challenge is to design systems that provide high assurance of the accuracy
of the outcome, whilst at the same time guaranteeing the secrecy of ballots.
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The problem of course is that these two requirements are in conflict. Each
taken in isolation would be trivial to achieve. In the absence of the secrecy
requirement, a simple show of hands guarantees accuracy. Equally, if accuracy
is not required, then secrecy is trivial: a constant function achieves this, i.e.,
the result is totally independent of the inputs.
Similarly, if we are prepared to place complete trust in the processes that
collect and count the votes then again there is no real problem. This, in
essence, is how the current UK systems works and, whilst there seem to be
good grounds to believe that such trust is well-placed for the time being, there
are contexts in which such trust would be wholly inappropriate. Who is to
say that the UK will remain as benign a political environment? It would seem
prudent therefore to explore voting systems that do not necessitate such trust.
The goal then is to provide assurance of accuracy and secrecy without
having to place any trust in the devices, processes and officials that conduct
the election. Put differently, we strive to design systems that will be resilient
to insider threats as well as to outsider threats.
A fundamental feature of secret ballot voting systems that distinguishes
them from conventional dependable systems is that there is no extrinsic way to
characterise the correctness of the outcome. By definition, there is no god-like
view that can determine if the outcome is correct and it is thus possible for an
election system to fail in a way that is not manifest. This is in contrast with,
say, an algorithm for computing square roots, or for that matter, avionics
software. The correctness of the outcome is clearly defined and independently
verifiable, or, turning this around, failures of such systems will be manifest.
Failures of voting software could go unnoticed and, even if suspected, may be
impossible to demonstrate.
As if all this were not challenging enough, we must also take account of all
the socio-technical aspects of the problem: our systems must be transparent
and simple enough to gain a reasonable degree of usability, public understand-
ing and trust. A technically perfect solution that fails to gain the confidence of
the electorate is not a viable solution. Furthermore, we must take account of
the surrounding socio-technical systems that maintain the electoral register,
authenticate voters, officials and scrutineers who supervise and observe the
process, etc.
To a cryptographer, with a rather paranoid view of the world, a voting
system is a highly hostile environment: the system is trying to cheat the
voters, the voters are trying to circumvent the system, officials are trying to
manipulate the system, coercers are attempting to influence voters, and voters
trying to cheat coercers. Curiously, the last of these is one that we want to
enable! Of course, all this is very much a worst case analysis, but if we can
make our systems resistant against such adversaries then they should also be
robust in less hostile environments. Like Hollywood producers, cryptographers
like their adversaries to be imbued with unlimited malevolence and cunning.
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1.3 Assumptions
Voting systems are large socio-technical systems comprising not only various
technical components but voting officials, voters, campaigners, potential co-
ercers etc. The process of an election goes far beyond merely collecting and
counting votes and has social, political, legal and psychological aspects. For
the purposes of this chapter, we will make a number of rather sweeping as-
sumptions and we will draw rather precise boundaries around the portion
of the voting system that we will discuss. In practice of course, all of these
assumptions have to be closely examined and the scheme evaluated in the
context of the wider socio-technical system.
We will confine our attention to the more technical processes and mecha-
nisms that capture and count the votes. We will assume that an accurate reg-
ister of eligible voters is maintained and that suitable access to this database is
ensured throughout the period of voting. We will assume that suitable mech-
anisms are in place to authenticate voters and ensure that they do not vote
more than once.
1.4 Voting System Requirements
At the most abstract level, we require that elections be free and fair. Freeness
can be taken to mean that, throughout the period of the election, legitimate
members of the electorate are able to express their intent without hindrance or
undue influence. Quite what constitutes “undue influence” is a rather delicate
matter. Some would contend that political manipulation of the media, bandy-
ing about of vacuous promises and so on constitute undue influence. We will
leave such matters to the political scientists and concentrate on eliminating
the rather crude but better defined threats of to vote buying and coercion.
Fairness is taken to mean that every voter is able to cast at most one vote
and that all votes cast are accurately counted and reflected in the final tally.
These rather vague statements are mapped down to more precise requirements
on the various components of the socio-technical system.
There is no universal consensus as to voting system requirements and
in any case, they will vary from application to application and according to
jurisdiction. Here we informally describe the commonly accepted requirements
of the vote capture and counting components of the system.
The primary goal of a voting system is integrity (a.k.a. accuracy): all legit-
imately cast votes should be accurately included in the count. Furthermore,
accuracy, like justice, should not only be done but also be seen to be done.
Thus we will strive for verifiability, i.e: mechanisms that demonstrate that
the count is accurate. Often, cryptographic schemes provide unconditional
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integrity, that is, they provide guarantees of integrity that do not depend
on computational assumptions. In other words, integrity is guaranteed even
against adversaries with unbounded computational power.
We will require that a voter’s choice is kept secret, often termed ballot se-
crecy or ballot privacy. This requirement stems from the need to avoid threats
of vote buying or coercion. Some forms of voting call for accountability, for
example parliamentary voting, and hence secrecy is not required.
In fact, absolute ballot secrecy is not required or provided by the UK
voting system. Rather, UK electoral law requires that it be possible for the
authorities, with appropriate court orders, etc, to trace ballots back to the
(claimed) identity of the person who cast the ballot. It is still expected that
no one other than appropriate authorities be able to establish how a particular
voter voted2. We will take ballot secrecy as a fundamental requirement in what
follows.
A rather novel requirement, not feasible in conventional systems, is that
of voter-verifiability. Voters are able to confirm that their vote is accurately
included in the count and, if not, to prove this to a judge. At the same time, the
voter is not able to prove to a third party which way they actually voted. At
first glance this seems impossible, but the schemes that we describe below do
realise this requirement. Modern cryptography regularly makes the seemingly
impossible quite routine!
Besides the above technical requirements, voting systems must also be
cost-efficient, easy for voters to use and sufficiently simple to gain a sufficient
degree of public understanding and trust. Discussion of these requirements is
outside the scope of this chapter, but we remark that the systems described
here are aimed at being as conceptually simple as possible.
1.5 Sources of Assurance
It is important to understand the starkly contrasting nature of the assurance
provided by different technologies. The most naive approach is simply to trust
the technology or process. In some contexts this is probably quite reasonable
e.g: using an ATM, where fraud is detectable and forms of insurance and
redress are available. Voting is definitely not in this category: elections are
essentially one-off events, fraud may go undetected and the consequences are
potentially global.
2 Cryptographic schemes can support a requirement to reveal links between receipts
and votes, but this requires the cooperation of a predefined threshold number of
servers. These servers could be controlled by independent authorities and organi-
sations. Thus, the checks and balances preventing abuses of such a capability are
far more transparent and accountable than at present.
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Assurance of correct behaviour of any system may be derived in various
ways. It might be based on (claims of) prior evaluation, verification and testing
of the system. Such analysis seeks to demonstrate that all possible system
executions will satisfy the requirements. On the other hand, assurance might
be derived from run-time monitoring of the system as it executes and end-to-
end checking of outputs, ensuring that any departure from correct behaviour
is detected.
Both approaches have a useful role to play in certain contexts and typ-
ically both must be employed, but the emphasis may vary. For systems in
which it may be hard to recover from a malfunction and you really want con-
fidence about future performance, e.g. an avionics system, emphasis must be
placed on the former. The drawback is that complete and correct analysis is
extremely difficult to achieve and, even if it were achieved, system degrada-
tion or upgrades, alteration of the code etc may all serve to invalidate any
analysis. Such assurance is thus very fragile.
End-to-end checking is independent of the software and hardware imple-
mentation and so is more robust: as long as we have a precise definition of
correct behaviour and can implement a suitable monitoring mechanism, we
can be confident that any errors will be detected and rectified. We are thus no
longer prey to the problems of incomplete analysis or testing, or the mutabil-
ity of software etc. In the case of voting systems, we argue that assurance of
integrity must be end-to-end. The correctness of the outcome must be math-
ematically verifiable, rather as the correctness of a square root algorithm is
independently verifiable. To borrow Benaloh’s phrase: we should verify the
election, not the system.
This is not to say that evaluation and testing of the system should be
ignored, but just that the accuracy of the outcome must not be contingent on
the correctness, coverage and continuing validity of such evaluation. Naturally
it is essential that an election run smoothly and not be plagued by malfunc-
tions and technology glitches, so careful testing and evaluation will be also be
essential.
1.5.1 Assurance of Privacy
The discussion above applies to the sources of assurance of integrity. Secrecy
and privacy properties are of quite a different nature to integrity properties.
Integrity is a safety property, i.e: can be characterised by defining what are
acceptable system behaviours. Secrecy properties, by contrast, are usually de-
fined in terms of the entire set of possible behaviours rather than individual
behaviours. Thus, for example, the secrecy provided by a stream cipher de-
pends on it being effectively indistinguishable to an adversary from a device
able to generate all possible random streams with equal probability (i.e: a
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one-time-pad). This is clearly not a property of any given behaviour but of
the ensemble of possible system behaviours.
Consequently, it is typically not possible to detect failures with respect to
a secrecy property by monitoring an individual system execution, rather as
it is not sensible to ask if a given bit sequence is random. It also tends to be
much harder to recover from secrecy failures (...it is hard to get the toothpaste
back in the tube as one US judge phrased it). Consequently, for secrecy, we
need to place more emphasis on prior verification than we do for integrity.
1.6 Verifiable Voting Schemes
Many cryptographic schemes that seek to provide high levels of assurance of
accuracy and secrecy have been proposed. Typically these strive to minimise
the need to place trust in the implementations and seek assurance through
maximal transparency. In accordance with the principle of no security through
obscurity, the details of these schemes are laid bare to universal scrutiny, so
that any flaws in the design can be detected before deployment. Furthermore,
the integrity of the election rests now on the validity of the mathematical
arguments rather than on mutable implementations.
This is a key and very subtle point: if the implementation malfunctions or
is subverted, this should be detected at run-time by the auditing procedures.
All the computations performed during the auditing phase are against publicly
known functions and hence independently verifiable by anyone who cares to
take the trouble. Furthermore, such verification is performed on data that is
frozen and committed rather than on observation of an ephemeral process.
1.7 Related Work
There is a large and rapidly growing literature on cryptographic voting
schemes and it is not appropriate to attempt to survey it all here. We will just
mention the most closely related literature, concentrating on schemes designed
for the supervised rather than remote context. A more complete survey can
be found in [3], and for anonymity mechanisms, mixes etc see the anonymity
bibliography, [1].
The first suggestion that cryptographic techniques could be applied to
voting systems appears to be Chaum’s 1981 paper on anonymising mixes, [6].
Benaloh and Tunistra, [5], introduce the notion of coercion-resistance along
with a scheme using homomorphic tabulation that satisfies it. Later, Chaum
[7] and Neff [28] introduced schemes that could be regarded as more practical
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than previous schemes. The original Preˆt a` Voter scheme, [34] and [33] was
inspired by the Chaum scheme, replacing the visual cryptography by the can-
didate permutation concept. Chaum has subsequently adopted this concept in
his new PunchScan scheme, [16]. Recently, Rivest has proposed ThreeBallot,
[32] that provides voter-verifiability without using cryptography.
1.8 Cryptographic primitives
Firstly we introduce some cryptographic primitives that will be used later.
In the interests of space, and not bogging the reader down in unnecessary
technical detail, we give very superficial descriptions, enough; we hope, to
make their role clear. For more detailed descriptions consult any book on
modern cryptography, e.g: Stinson [39]. Note also that this overview is not
intended to be exhaustive: we stick to those required for Preˆt a` Voter. We
assume familiarity with the basics of number theory. No offence will be taken
if you are familiar with modern cryptography and choose to skip this section.
1.8.1 Public key cryptography
Some thirty years ago, the rather shadowy discipline of cryptography wit-
nessed a major revolution: in 1976 Diffie and Hellman published a paper,
[13] that, for the first time in the open literature, proposed the possibility of
public key cryptography. Arguably, this paper did for cryptography what Ein-
stein’s 1905 special relativity paper did for theoretical physics. Prior to 1976,
it was implicitly assumed that secret communication could only be achieved
between parties who already shared secret material. Diffie and Hellman over-
turned this assumption by suggesting that it should be possible for complete
strangers who did not share any prior secrets to communicate secretly over
open channels.
At first glance this suggestion seems absurd. To realise it requires the con-
cept of one-way-functions: functions that are easy to compute in one direction
but intractable to compute in the other. One such function is that of multi-
plication: multiplying a pair of given numbers is straightforward yet, given a
number, finding its prime factors is in general extremely difficult.
Using the concept of one way functions, it is possible to implement en-
cryption algorithms with the following features: Anne creates a pair of keys,
one that is made public, the other Anne keeps secret. The public key can be
used by anyone to encrypt a message for Anne, but decryption can only be
performed with knowledge of the secret key. Thus, Anne, and only Anne, can
decrypt such messages. From a classical cryptography perspective this seems
impossible: encryption and decryption keys are closely related, often identical.
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The key point is that knowledge of the public encryption key does not entail
knowledge of the secret key.
The ideas of public key were in fact anticipated, in secret, at the Govern-
ment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In 1970 James Ellis came up
with the idea of non-secret encryption and in 1973, Clifford Cocks came up
with an implementation of the concept that is essentially the same as the RSA
algorithm we describe below. None of this was available in the open litera-
ture until recently, so it is fair to say that these concepts were independently
re-invented.
1.8.2 RSA Encryption
The first realisation of the public key concept to appear in the open literature
is that proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, [30]. The security of the
scheme rests on the assumed difficulty of factorising. First, Anne first identifies
two large prime numbers, p and q. By “large” here we typically mean of the
order of a hundred digits. Given that factorisation is hard, it would appear
to be hard to find large primes. However, efficient algorithms exist for finding
primes that do not involve factorising. Typically such algorithms do not yield
primes with certainty but with arbitrarily high probabilities 3.
Let n := p · q. Now Anne chooses an encryption exponent e such that
gcd(e, n) = 1, i.e., e must be co-prime to n. Now she finds d such that:
e · d = 1 (mod φ(n))
Where φ(n) is Euler’s totient function, in this case φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q −
1). This computation can be performed very efficiently using the extended
Euclidean algorithm. Now Anne can make n and e public whilst she keeps d
(and p, q and φ(n)) secret. Now Bob can encrypt a message m say, which is
suitably encoded as a number in Zn, the set of residue classes modulo n, as:
c := me (mod n)
Anne can decrypt this by computing:
cd = me·d = m (mod n)
3 A simple example of such an algorithm is based on Fermat’s Little Theorem: if
p is prime, then ∀a ∈ Z∗p , ap−1 = 1 (mod p). Thus, for a putative prime p, we
choose a set of a’s at random and check whether Fermat’s congruence holds for
all of them. If it does then we have, with high probability identified a prime p.
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To see why this works, note that, by construction, e · d = r · φ(n) + 1 for
some r ∈ Z. So, by Euler’s generalisation of Fermat’s Little Theorem:
∀a ∈ Z∗n : aφ(n) = 1 (mod n)
Where Z∗n is the set of residue classes modulo n with multiplicative inverse,
i.e., Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn|gcd(a, n) = 1}.
It follows that:
me·d = mφ(n)·r+1 = mφ(n)·r ·m1 = 1 ·m = m (mod n)
as required.
Computing exponents in a finite field can be done very efficiently using
repeated squaring and multiplication. Computing d from e in is straightfor-
ward with the knowledge of the factorisation of n, and hence of φ(n). Without
knowing the factorisation there is no known, efficient way to find d short of
essentially exhaustive search. No efficient algorithm is known to factorise com-
posite numbers that are the products of such large primes. Hence it is believed
that it is intractable to compute d given only n and e, i.e, without knowledge
of the factorisation of n. So, as long as Anne guards the secret value d, and
the factorisation of n, she alone can decrypt messages encrypted using her
public key. Anyone knowing n and e can encrypt messages for Anne. Anne of
course started with the primes p and q and so is not faced with the problem
of discovering them by factorising n.
1.8.3 ElGamal Encryption
RSA as described above is deterministic; encrypting a given plaintext twice
yields the same ciphertext. We now describe a couple of randomising algo-
rithms for which repeatedly encrypting a given plaintext will yield different
ciphertexts each time.
The first algorithm is due to ElGamal, [14]. Anne finds a large prime p and
a primitive element α of the multiplicative group Z∗p (α is said to be primitive
if every element of Z∗p can be expressed as a power of α). Anne chooses a
random k from Zp and computes:
β := αk (mod p)
The public keys are p, α and β, k is kept secret. Encryption of m yields a
pair of terms computed thus:
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c := (y1, y2) := (αr,m · βr) (mod p)
where r is chosen at random from Zp. Anne, with the knowledge of k, is
able to decrypt as follows:
m = y2/yk1 (mod p)
The security of ElGamal rests on the presumed difficulty of taking discrete
logs in a finite field. We remarked earlier that taking exponents is perfectly
tractable, but the inverse operation of taking discrete logs is believed to be
intractable. Thus, recovering the secret k exponent from knowledge of p, α
and β is thought to be intractable.
A randomising algorithm like ElGamal allows the possibility of re-encryption:
anyone who knows the public keys can re-randomise the original encryption
with a new random value r′:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′ · y1, βr′ · y2)
which gives:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′+r, βr
′+r ·m)
Clearly, this is equivalent to simply encrypting m with the randomisation
r + r′ and decryption is performed exactly as before. We will see the utility
of re-encryption when we come to describe anonymising mixes. Note that,
crucially, the device performing the re-encryption does not use any secret
keys and at no point in the re-encryption process is the plaintext revealed.
1.8.4 Paillier encryption
Paillier is another randomising algorithm that, due to its homomorphic prop-
erties, is very handy in voting applications, [29]. Key generation proceeds as
follows: firstly generate an RSA integer n = p with p and q large primes and
compute the Carmichael function of n: λ := lcm(p−1, q−1). Find a generator
g of Z∗n2 such that g = 1 (mod n). The public key, (n, g) is published whilst
λ forms the secret key.
The encryption of a message m ∈ Zn is computed as:
c = E(m, r) = gmrn (mod n2)
Where r is a freshly generated random value drawn from Z∗n.
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Decryption is given by:
m =
L(cλ (mod n2))
L(gλ (mod n2))
(mod n)
Where, for convenience, we have defined L(x) := (x− 1)/n.
We won’t go into exactly why this rather surprising formula works. The
key ingredient is that fact that:
∀a ∈ Z∗n2 : an.λ(n) = 1 (mod n2)
Judicious use of the binomial theorem to expand g, expressed as 1 + k · n,
and noting that terms with n2 or higher order in n vanish taken modulo n2,
serves to move the plaintext m term from the exponent to a linear term.
Due to the way that the plaintext is carried in the exponent, the Paillier
algorithm enjoys the homomorphic property:
EP (a; r)× EP (b; s) = EP (a+ b; r × s)
Where EP (x; r) denotes the encryption of x and randomisation r. That is,
the product of the encryption of two plaintexts equals the encryption of the
sum of the plaintexts.
1.8.5 Threshold Cryptography
It is often important not to have to depend on a single entity to perform
cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, signing, etc. This
prompts the development of techniques and algorithms to distribute the
knowledge of the secret key amongst a set of entities Φ in such a way that
only a quorum of Φ can perform the operation. An (m, k) threshold scheme
for example allows k or more entities from a set of size m, (k < m), to collab-
orate to perform the operation. Any smaller set of size < k will be unable to
perform the operation, nor will they be able to obtain any information about
the secret key.
1.8.6 Anonymising Mixes
Anonymising mixes were first proposed by Chaum [6] and play a key role
in many voting schemes. They come in two flavours: decryption and re-
encryption, but hybrids are also possible.
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In decryption mixes, a deterministic algorithm such as RSA is used. The
plaintexts are encrypted in layers under the public keys of a set of mix servers.
The batch of encrypted terms is passed to the first server that strips off the
outer layer of encryption and performs a secret shuffle of the resulting terms.
The resulting, partially decrypted, shuffled terms are passed on to the next
server that strips off a further layer, shuffles the resulting terms and passes
this along to the next. Thus, the batch of encrypted terms is put through
a series of such mixes that progressively decrypt and shuffle. At the end of
these mixes, the raw, decrypted votes pop out but with any link to the original
terms obliterated by the multiple shuffles.
For re-encryption mixes, a randomising algorithm such as ElGamal or
Paillier is used. Instead of striping off layers of encryption at each step of the
mix, the mix servers re-randomise the encryption. The mix servers do not
hold any secret keys: re-randomisation can be performed by any entity that
knows the public key. A sequence of such mixes can then be followed by a
(threshold) decryption by servers that hold the appropriate secret keys.
The fact that all the terms passing through a mix undergo a transfor-
mation, either decryption of re-encryption, at each stage ensures that they
cannot be simply traced through the mix by pattern matching, as long as at
least one of the servers remains honest.
1.8.7 Homomorphic Tabulation
Anonymising mixes are well-suited to taking a batch of encrypted ballots and
outputting the decrypted ballots in a shuffled order. An alternative way to
tabulate a batch of encrypted ballots is to use homomorphic tabulation. Here,
a cryptographic primitive is employed that exhibits algebraic homomorphic
properties that enables the count to be performed without needing to decrypt
individual ballots. For example, the Paillier algorithm has the property that
the product of the encryption of a set of values equals the encryption of the
sum of the values:
n∏
i
EP (xi) = EP (
n∑
i
xi)
This property can be exploited to extract the overall count without having
to decrypt individual votes. For a simple yes/no referendum, yes votes are rep-
resented by (randomised) encryptions of +1, whilst no votes are encryptions
of 0. Suppose that n votes are cast. The product of the encryptions of votes
is formed and the result decrypted. If the overall sum is greater than n/2,
the ayes carry it, if the sum is less than n/2 the nays have it. For elections
with choices of more than 2 candidates or options, more subtle encodings are
required, [4].
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Tabulation using mixes can thus be thought of as analogous to conventional
counting of paper ballots whilst homomorphic tabulation can be thought of
as roughly analogous to the operation of lever machines: only the cumulative
totals for each candidate are output. Care has to be taken to ensure that
ballots are only ever encryptions of the either 0 or 1, otherwise there are
dangers of a single ballot seriously skewing the count.
1.8.8 Cut and Choose
Cut-and-choose is a common device to avoid having to trust a device that per-
forms a cryptographic operation, typically encryption. The obvious approach
is to require the keys or randomisations to be revealed so that the encryption
can be checked. In many situations, notably voting, this is not satisfactory as
the proof could be transferred to another party, i.e: a coercer. Verifiying the
encrypted term renders it useless in the rest of the protocol 4. What we want
is a way for the verifier to be confident that the encryption is correct without
being able to prove this to anyone else.
The name comes from the familiar protocol for ensuring fairness in the
sharing out of a cake: one party makes the cut whilst the other gets to choose.
The effect is to motivate the first party to try to cut as fairly as possible. Anal-
ogously, an encryption device is required to commit to several independent
encryptions of the given plaintext. It is then challenged to reveal the keys or
randomising factors for all but one, randomly chosen by the requestor. If all
of the challenged encryptions prove to be valid then it is a good bet that the
un-revealed encryption is valid too and can be used in the rest of the protocol.
1.8.9 Zero-knowledge proofs
Cut-and-chooose protocols involve generating an excess number of ciphertexts,
auditing a randomly selected subset and rejecting the audited elements, as
their cover has been blown. A more subtle way of establishing confidence that,
for example a given ciphertext really is an encryption of a claimed plaintext,
is to use zero-knowledge proofs.
An interactive zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a protocol in which one
party, the prover P, demonstrates the truth of a claim or knowledge of a
fact to another, the verifier V, without V learning anything other than the
truth of the statement. Such protocols typically involve a sequence of random
challenges issued by the verifier to the prover.
4 This reminds me of being puzzled as a kid by talk of “testing the bomb”.
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A typical example of such a protocol is the Chaum-Pedersen protocol,
[9] that is designed to prove plaintext equivalence of a pair of ElGamal en-
cryptions without revealing either the plaintext, the secret key or the re-
randomising factor. This situation crops up where a server has performed
a re-encryption on an ElGamal ciphertext and wants to prove the correct-
ness without revealing the re-randomisation factor. The proof is reducable to
showing that a tuple (α, β, w, u) is a so-called Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
tuple (α, αk, αx, αk.x), i.e., ∃ x and k such that w = αx, u = αx·k and β = αk.
Here, k is thought of as the secret ElGamal key and x the re-encryption factor.
Where the prover P is a mix server demonstrating plaintext equivalence, P
will know the re-encryption factor x but not the decryption key k.
The three step protocol follows the standard pattern for ZK proofs: P
generates some fresh randomness, s, that serves to blind the secret and makes
a commitment. V responds with a random challenge, c, to which P should
only be able to respond with the value t = s+ c.x verifiable by V , if he really
knows the secret value x.
1. s ∈ Z∗q : P → V : (a, b, ) = (αs, βs)
2. c ∈ Z∗q : V → P : c
3. P → V : t = s+ c.x
Now V can check:
αt = a.wc and βt = b.uc
Informally, we see that the secret, random factor s chosen by P serves
to conceal the secret value x from V . If P does not know x, or indeed, the
claimed equivalence is false and such an x does not exist, it will be virtually
impossible him, aside from an absurdly unlikely lucky guess, to respond to v’s
challenge value c with a value t that will pass V ’s checks.
A variant of this protocol can be used to demonstrate the correctness of
a claimed decryption of a given ElGamal ciphertext. Again, the proof can
reduced to the proof of a DDH tuple. In this case, P knows k but not the
randomising factor x so we simply interchange their role in the protocol.
Suppose that we have the ElGamal ciphertext (y1, y2) = (αk,m.βk) and P
claims that this decrypts to m′. To check that m = m′ we require P prove
that the tuple (α, β, y1, y2/m′) is a DDH tuple, which it will be iff m = m′.
A similar protocol to prove correct decryption of a Paillier ciphertext can
be found at [11] in the case in which the prover knows the randomisation.
For Paillier it turns out that knowledge of the secret key allows the prover
to recover the randomisation as well as the plaintext. Thus there is no need
for a separate protocol for the case in which the prover is ignorant of the
randomisation. This is in contrast to ElGamal, where knowledge of the secret
key does not help recovering the randomisation.
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1.8.10 Digital Signatures
These are the digital analogue of conventional signatures. Anne can digitally
sign a textM by computing a publicly agreed crypto hash ofM and encrypting
this under her private key. This encrypted hash is appended to the text M :
SigA(M) :=M, {Hash(M)}SKA
If Bob knows Anne’s public key, he can verify the signature as follows: he
applies Anne’s public key to the encrypted term and applies the hash function
to the plaintext M term. If the outcome of these two computations agree, he
may be confident that the textM was indeed signed by Anne and has not been
altered. This assumes that Anne’s private key has not been compromised.
1.9 Voter-verifiable Schemes
Cryptography opens up novel and surprising possibilities, in particular the no-
tion of voter-verifiability. A system that enjoys voter-verifiability enables vot-
ers to confirm to their own satisfaction that their vote is accurately recorded
and counted whilst at the same time denying them any way of proving how
they voted to a third party. The key idea to achieving voter-verifiability is
to provide voters with a physical receipt at the time of casting that carries
their vote in encrypted form. Voters are later able to confirm, via a secure
Web Bulletin Board (WBB) or similar 5, that their receipt has been correctly
entered into a robust, anonymising tabulation process. We need mechanisms
to ensure that:
• The voter’s choice is accurately encoded in the receipt.
• The voter’s receipt is accurately posted to the WBB.
• The tabulation process accurately decrypts all posted receipts.
If all three assertions are be demonstrated, then each voter may, by con-
firming that their receipt is accurately input into the tabulation, be confident
that their vote is counted as cast. Furthermore, if their receipt fails to appear
correctly on the WBB, they have tangible proof of this. The fact that their
vote is encrypted in the receipt ensures that they cannot use it to prove how
they voted to a coercer or vote-buyer.
Over the past few years, a number of cryptographic schemes have been
proposed to implement this concept and to provide voting systems with high
5 The list of encrypted receipts could be published for example in The Times
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assurance of accuracy and ballot secrecy. Such schemes strive to empower the
voters by providing them with the means to help contribute to the depend-
ability of the process. Dependability by the people for the people one might
say.
The Preˆt a` Voter suite of schemes constitutes a class of particularly voter-
friendly, voter-verifiable schemes and we outline a simple instance of this class
in the next section. Later we will explore a number of threats to which this
basic version is vulnerable. This will lead us to develop a number of enhanced
versions. It is hoped that this style of presentation will result in gentle intro-
duction to the key ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter approach whilst making
clear the subtleties involved in designing such schemes.
1.10 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
Here we outline the main ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme, [35, 8, 38].
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is the way votes are encoded
in a randomised frame of reference, i.e: a randomised candidate list. An im-
portant observation about this way of encoding the vote is that, in contrast
to previous schemes, there is no need for the voter to communicate their vote
to an encryption device. What is encrypted is the information that defines
the frame of reference for any given ballot form, and this can be computed in
advance. We will return to the significance of this observation later when we
discuss the threat model. Incidentally, this encoding has another advantage:
the randomisation of the candidate list results in fairness as a fixed ordering
tends to favour candidates near the top of the list.
1.10.1 The Voting Ceremony
At the polling station, our voter Anne pre-registers and chooses at random
a ballot form from a pile of forms individually sealed in envelopes. Example
forms are shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Note that the order of the candidates
and the cryptographic values vary from form to form.
In the booth, Anne removes the ballot from its envelope and makes her
selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right hand column against
the candidate of choice, or, in the case of a Single Transferable Vote (STV)
system for example, she marks her ranking against the candidates. Once the
selection has been made, she detaches and discards the left hand strip that
carries the candidate order. The remaining right hand strip now constitutes
the receipt, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Anne now exits the booth with this receipt, registers with an official and
casts her receipt in the presence of the official. The ballot receipt is placed
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Candidates Your vote
Obelix
Idefix
Asterix
Panoramix
7rJ94K
Destroy Retain
Fig. 1.1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
Candidates Your vote
Asterix
Idefix
Panoramix
Obelix
N5077t3
Destroy Retain
Fig. 1.2. Another Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
Your Vote
X
7rJ94K
Retain
Fig. 1.3. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt encoding a vote for “Idefix”
against an optical reader or similar device that records the cryptographic
value at the bottom of the strip, that we will refer to henceforth as the ballot
onion and denote Θ, and an index value ι indicating the cell into which the
X was marked. A digital signature is computed over {ι, Θ} and this signature
is printed on Anne’s receipt.
The digitized copies of the receipts are transmitted to a central tabulation
server which posts them to a secure WBB. This is an append-only, publicly
visible facility. Only the tabulation server, and later the tabulation tellers,
can write to this and, once written, anything posted will remain unchanged.
Voters are encouraged to visit this WBB and confirm that their receipt appears
correctly and, if their receipt does not appear, or appears incorrectly (i.e.,
with the X in the wrong position), they can appeal. Note that, as the voters
hold physical, authenticated receipts, they have demonstrable grounds for
complaint if their receipt fails to appear.
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At the time of casting of the vote, in addition to the digital copy of the
receipt, it is possible for an additional paper copy to be printed and verified
by the voter and officials and added to an encrypted paper audit trail. This is
similar to the notion of a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail but with encrypted
receipts, the audit trail can be printed on a paper roll like a till receipt without
jeopardizing privacy 6. This is easier to implement a record on a single roll
and it is much harder to manipulate than a bundle of ballots. A VEPAT can
also serve as the basis for additional checks of correspondence between the
audit record and what is posted to the WBB to be performed by independent
auditors to supplement voter checks.
It is also possible to have representatives of Helper Organisations, [3], at
hand at the polling stations. They could offer a receipt verification service:
checking digital signatures and possibly checking of posting of receipts to the
WBB.
1.10.2 Vote Counting
The value printed on the bottom of the RH column of the ballot forms, that
we will refer to as the ballot onion, is the key to extraction of the vote. Buried
cryptographically in this value is the information needed to reconstruct the
candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on the receipt. This
information is encrypted under the secret keys shared using a threshold scheme
amongst a number of tellers. Thus, only a threshold set of the tellers acting in
concert are able to reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the vote
value encoded on the receipt.
Each form will have a unique, secret seed value ρ drawn from some seed
space S. The candidate permutation is computed using function σ that is
publicly agreed prior to the election: : S → ΠC , where ΠC is the set of
permutations on the candidate set C. Thus each ballot form may be thought
of as a tuple:
(pi,Θ)
where pi is the candidate order and the encrypted term Θ = E(ρ)) is the
onion. The ballot is well-formed if and only if pi = σ(ρ). The value ρ is kept
secret. A receipt has the form:
(ι, Θ)
6 With a conventional VVPAT. system with un-encrypted ballots, using a till roll
record introduces the possibility of correlation between the order on the roll and
the order voters entered the booth.
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Where ι is an index value indicating where the voter placed her X or a
vector giving her rankings.
After a suitable period, assuming that checks on the posted receipts are
satisfactory or at least suitably resolved, we can start the counting process.
Here we will describe counting using anonymising mixes to guarantee bal-
lot secrecy and partial random checking to guarantee correctness. Other ap-
proaches are possible, for example, if Paillier encryption is used it would be
feasible to use homomorphic tabulation.
We assume that the candidate list information has been encrypted in the
ballot onions using a randomising algorithm that supports re-encryption, e.g:
ElGamal or Paillier. We also assume for the moment that the index values,
indicating the position of the X for example, has been absorbed into the
onion term to give a pure ElGamal or Paillier term. Details will be presented
a little later. Tabulation proceeds in two phases: first a mixing phase to provide
privacy (rather like shaking the ballot box) followed by a decryption phase
(unsealing and unlocking the ballot box). The first phase will be performed
by a set of mix tellers. The mix tellers do not need to know any secret keys in
order to perform a re-encryption, only the public key under which the onion
encryption was performed.
Suppose that we have j mix tellers, each of which will perform two re-
encryption mixes before handing on to the next teller. Requiring each mix
teller to perform two mixes is a convenient device to facilitate the audit pro-
cess, as we will see shortly. More precisely, the first mix teller takes in the
batch of receipts, re-encrypts each and then performs a secret shuffle on the
resulting batch of terms. The resulting batch of transformed, shuffled terms is
posted to the next column of the WBB. The first teller then takes the output
of its first mix and repeats the process, but with an independent shuffle, and
again posts the result to the next column of the WBB. Once the first teller
has finished performing its two mixes, the second teller takes the output batch
of the previous teller’s second mix and performs two further mixes, and so on
through the full set of mix tellers.
At the end of this process, the batch of receipts will have undergone 2j
re-encryptions and shuffles and are ready to be decrypted. Decryption will
then be performed by a threshold set of decryption tellers who hold secret
shares for the onion encryption.
Once all this is completed, the final, decrypted, anonymised votes appear
in the final column of the WBB and these can be tallied in a conventional and
universally verifiable fashion.
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1.11 Auditing the Election
So far we have described the process under the assumption that all the steps
are executed faithfully. We do not want the integrity of the election to rely on
any of the entities involved behaving correctly and so we now introduce the
mechanisms that serve to detect any malfunction or corruption.
1.11.1 Auditing the Ballot Generation Authority
The first place that things could go wrong is in the creation of the ballot
forms. If a ballot form is incorrectly constructed, in the sense that the can-
didate list shown on the form does not correspond to the order given by the
seed value buried in the onion value on the form, then the voter’s choice will
not be accurately encoded. We therefore need a mechanism to detect incor-
rectly constructed forms, without revealing keys, seed values or randomisation
values.
If, as we have done above, we assume that the ballot forms are created
in advance, we can perform a random audit on a proportion of the forms.
So, we require the ballot creation authority (or authorities) to create an ex-
cess number of forms, perhaps twice as many as actually required, and allow
independent organisations to make random selections of an appropriate pro-
portion. For example, we might allocate five auditing organisations and allow
each to select up to 10%. For these selected forms, the seed and/or randomi-
sation factors are revealed, so allowing the auditors to recompute the values
and confirm that they agree with those printed on the forms.
A rather elegant way of revealing the audit information for selected forms
whilst ensuring that it is kept secret for ballot forms that are used to cast
votes, is the “Scratch and Vote” mechanism of Adida and Rivest, [3]. Here,
the audit information is printed on the ballot forms but concealed by a scratch
strip. Revealing the information by removing the strip automatically invali-
dates the form for voting. Previously, this information was revealed by hav-
ing the decryption tellers on-line to extract the seeds for audited forms. The
Adida/Rivest approach avoids the need to have the tellers on-line.
The process of auditing a ballot form is accomplished by recomputing
the values on the form from the cryptographic values. Thus the onion is re-
computed from the seed value, randomisation and the teller public keys. The
candidate order is also recomputed using the publicly known function σ from
the seed space to space of permutations of the candidate set. If these agree
with the values printed on the form, then the voter may conclude that the
form was correctly formed by the device.
In addition to the audits performed by appropriate authorities before,
during and after the election, we can invite the voters also to choose forms at
random for audit. We will discuss such possibilities in detail later.
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1.11.2 Auditing the Mix Tellers
Next, we need to confirm that the mix tellers perform all their actions cor-
rectly, i.e: each column is a re-encryption and permutation of the previous
column, without revealing the permutations. Numerous techniques have been
proposed to achieve this, for example the approach proposed by Neff, [28].
For comprehensive descriptions of various techniques see [3] or [12]. The tech-
nique that we describe here, as it is both rather intuitive and flexible, is that
of randomised partial checking [21]. Half the links are randomly chosen to be
revealed and verified. The choice of links, whilst essentially random, is care-
fully constrained in such a way as to ensure that no decrypted vote can be
traced back to the original ballot receipt.
The selection process is best described as follows. Recall that each mix
teller performs two mixes and so has three columns of the WBB associated
with it: an input column, a middle column (the output of its first mix) and
a final output column (the output of its second mix, which also serves as the
input for the next teller). The auditor goes down the middle column and for
each term makes a random left/right choice. If left is chosen, the teller is
required to reveal the incoming link (the source term in the previous column)
and the associated re-randomisation factor for that link. Similarly, if right is
chosen, the teller must reveal the outgoing link. Thus each link has a 50/50
chance of being audited and yet our construction ensures no complete link
across the two mixes associated with the teller.
The figure 1.4 illustrates this. The first column, marked posting 1, is the
input to the first teller. The second column is the output of its first mix and
the third column is both the output of the second mix and the input to the
first mix of the next teller. The auditor makes random L/R selections down
this middle column and the teller must reveal the incoming or outgoing link
information accordingly. Similarly for the fourth column, that is the middle
column for the second teller.
For each of these audited links, the teller must reveal appropriate au-
dit information, for example the re-randomisation fact or a ZK proof of re-
randomisation. The auditors confirm that the target term is indeed a genuine
re-encryption of the claimed source term. These calculations may be confirmed
by anyone. The process is repeated with independent auditing selections for
each of the tellers.
1.11.3 Auditing the Decryption Tellers
Finally, we also need to confirm that the final decryptions are performed cor-
rectly. Here we can be more direct and can audit every decryption step as we
do not need to worry about anonymity at this stage as this is already pro-
vided by the mix phase. Thus we need simply check that each decrypted vote
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Fig. 1.4. Revealed links for auditing of two tellers
does indeed encrypt to the corresponding term in the previous column. Given
that we are using randomising encryptions here, the process of checking the
correctness of the decryptions is not quite trivial: we cannot simply perform
the encryption of the claimed plaintext and check the result agrees with the
ciphertext, and of course we don’t want to reveal the secret keys. Here we can
use the ZK proof techniques of Damg˚ard et al, [11], to check that all partial
decryption shares are valid and the final combination of shares is publically
verifiable.
1.12 Threats and Trust Models
We now discuss a number of known threats against voting systems, in partic-
ular voter-verifiable schemes. For some of these, the scheme described above
is already robust. For others, such as ensuring the secrecy of the information
created by the ballot generation authority, chain of custody etc, we will need
to introduce enhancements, described in the following section.
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1.12.1 Leaky Ballot Creation Authority
So far, we have assumed that a single authority is responsible for the gen-
eration and printing of the ballot forms and proposed random pre-auditing
to ensure that ballot forms are correctly constructed and are suitably ran-
domised. Whilst this removes the need to trust the authority with respect to
the integrity requirement, we still need to trust the authority to preserve the
secrecy of the seed value and the onion/candidate list association. Clearly, if
the ballot authority were to leak this information, the scheme would become
susceptible to coercion or vote buying.
1.12.2 Chain of Custody
Here the threat is to the integrity and secrecy of the ballots forms between
the time of their creation and use. We need to provide mechanisms to ensure
that none of the onion/candidate list associations are leaked during storage
and distribution. We also need to guard against corrupt ballot forms being
smuggled into the system after the random auditing phase.
Various counter-measures are possible, for example, anti-counterfeiting
measures could be used to prevent fakes being introduced. Ballot forms could
be kept in sealed envelopes to be revealed only by the voters in the booth.
Alternatively, a scratch card style mechanism along the lines suggested in [37]
could be used to conceal the onion value until it is revealed at the time of
vote casting. The ballot forms would also need to be stored and distributed in
locked, sealed boxes. Further random audits could be performed throughout
the voting period, perhaps giving voters the opportunity to audit forms too.
All of these counter-measures are rather procedural in nature and so re-
quire various trust assumptions. We will see shortly how on-demand printing
and distributed construction of encrypted ballots along with post-auditing
provide arguably stronger counter-measures, i.e. requiring weaker trust as-
sumptions.
1.12.3 Chain Voting
Conventional pencil and paper elections are vulnerable to a style of vote buy-
ing known as chain voting. The UK system in particular is vulnerable. Here,
the ballot forms are a controlled resource: on entering the polling station, the
voter is registered and marked off on the electoral roll. They are given a ballot
form which they take to the booth, mark and then cast in the ballot box. In
principle, officials should observe the voters casting their ballot.
The attack works as follows: the coercer smuggles a blank ballot form out
of the polling station. The controls on the distribution of the forms should
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make this a little tricky, but in practise there are many ways it could be
achieved by for example bribing an official or sleight of hand. Having marked
the form for the candidate of their choice, the coercer intercepts a voter as
they enter the polling station. The voter is told that if, when they exit the
polling station, they hand a fresh, blank form back to the coercer they will
receive a reward. The coercer can now use this form on the next victim and so
on. Note that, once the attack is initialised, the controls on the ballot forms
works in the coercer’s favour: if the voter emerges from the polling station
with a blank form, it is a strong indication that they did indeed cast the
marked form they were given by the coercer.
For conventional, paper ballot systems, there are known counters to this
threat, [22]. However, for voter-verifiable schemes with preprinted ballot forms
the problem rears its head with a vengeance as the coercer who has obtained
prior sight of Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is able to check via the WBB that the
ballot has been cast as required.
1.12.4 Side Channels and Subliminal Channels
A common concern with electronic voting is that the device that captures
the voter’s choice may somehow leak this information, over a hidden wire,
wifi, electromagnetic radiation etc. Recently a model of Nedap touch screen
machine was decertified in the Netherlands precisely because it was found that
votes could be detected several metres away by measuring EM radiation. All
touch screen machines and most cryptographic schemes are potentially liable
to such side-channel attacks.
More subtly, the device might exploit some form of subliminal channel
to encode information in a legitimate channel, for example the WBB. Karlof
et al, [25], describe the possibility of semantic and random channels in the
original Chaum scheme and a version of the VoteHere scheme.
Most electronic voting systems necessarily involve the voter’s choice be-
ing communicated to a device that records or encrypts the vote and so are
potentially vulnerable. A important feature of Preˆt a` Voter is that the voter
does not need to communicate their choice to any device. As remarked earlier,
the vote is encoded in a randomised frame of reference. All that is encrypted
is the information that defines the frame and this encryption and this can
be performed in advance, without any knowledge of the vote value or indeed
the identity of the voter who will eventually use the ballot form. This means
that side-channel and subliminal channel attacks are neatly side-stepped: the
device simply does not learn the information and so cannot leak it even if it
had access to suitable channels.
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1.12.5 Kleptographic Channels
Whilst Preˆt a` Voter avoids side-channels and subliminal channels, a further
subtle vulnerability can occur where a single entity is responsible for creating
cryptographic variables. So called kleptographic channels as described in [40]
are a possibility in Preˆt a` Voter if we use a single authority for the generation
of the ballot forms. The possible relevance of such attacks to cryptographic
voting schemes is described in [27]. The idea is that the entity may carefully
choose the values of the crypto variables in order to leak information to a
colluding party.
In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, the Authority might choose the seed values
in such a way that a keyed cryptographic hash of the onion value indicates
the candidate order. The keyed hash would be shared with a colluding party.
Clearly, executing such an attack would require quite a bit of searching and
computation to find suitable seed values. Such an attack could pass unnoticed:
the distribution of seed values would look perfectly random to anyone ignorant
of the hash function. We will see shortly how introducing a pseudo-random
generation of seeds or a distributed construction for the ballot forms in which
a number of entities contribute to the entropy of the crypto variables counters
this style of attack.
1.12.6 Retention of the Candidate List
In order to avoid coercion threats, it is essential to ensure that the association
between the receipt and the LH strip, that carries the candidate list, is elimi-
nated. Otherwise, a coerced voter may be induced to smuggle the LH portion
of the ballot form out of the polling station in order to show the coercer how
she voted. Various measures are possible, for example, a mechanical device
that enforces the destruction of the LH strip. Perhaps the neatest approach
is to ensure an ample supply of decoy LH strips so that a voter who is being
coerced could simply pick up an alternative strip showing a candidate order
that meets the coercer’s requirements. A further simple technique is to seg-
ment the LH strip horizontally between the candidate names in such a way
as to ensure that the strip will fall apart once detached from the RH strip.
1.12.7 Collusion between Mix Tellers and Auditors
Collusion between the mix tellers and the auditors can undermine integrity. If
a teller knows in advance which links will be audited, they can corrupt ballots
along the unaudited links with impunity. Drawing the tellers and auditors
from hostile organisations helps reduce the likelihood of collusion. A publicly
verifiable mechanism to generate the selections based for example on a public
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lottery is another possibility. A more technical approach, based on the Fiat and
Shamir heuristic [17] is to derive the audit selections from a pre-determined
cryptographic hash of the posted information.
If re-encryption mixes are used, then is it feasible to re-run the mixes, or
indeed run several mixes in parallel using independent tellers and indepen-
dently audit these using different auditing authorities. The fact that mixes
and audits can be rerun without undermining privacy is one of the key ad-
vantages of using re-encryption mixes over decryption mixes. With decryption
mixes, the set of terms generated at each stage will be the same each time the
mix is rerun and so it is not possible to independently audit different runs of
the mixes without revealing too much information.
1.12.8 Ballot Stuffing
Another danger, common to all voting systems, is that of voting officials smug-
gling in extra ballots into the count. Voters checking their receipts does not
detect ballot stuffing. One simple counter is simply to check that the number
of votes counted matches the number registered as having been cast. A more
sophisticated approach is to post the names on the WBB of voters who have
participated, so that anyone listed who did not participate can object. This
counter-mechanism has dangers of its own, e.g. forced abstention attacks: vot-
ers are told that if they vote as all they will be punished. The balance between
such threats is difficult to evaluate and probably depends on context.
1.13 Enhancements and Counter-measures
For many of the threats that we have identified, Preˆt a` Voter is either resistant
or we have suggested counter-measures. To address the remaining threats we
now describe some enhancements to the basic scheme.
1.13.1 On-demand Generation of Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Forms
Generating the ballot forms in advance has several; attractive features: sim-
plicity and the ability to catch problems early. It does however have the disad-
vantage that we have to worry about chain of custody issues. In this section we
present a mechanism to generate the forms ab initio, including generating the
seed entropy, in the booth. In the next section we will describe a distributed
construction of encrypted ballot forms.
We assume that the public key of the tellers, PKT = (g, n), is suitably
certified and publicised and that there is a publicly agreed function, σ, from
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the seed space in to the set of permutations of the candidates. For the purposes
of this section we will further assume that each booth device creates two public
key pairs PKb1, SKb1 and PKb2, SKb2.
Anne is now given a form at random that carries only a unique, random
serial number ξ. When she enters the booth, she feeds this form into a device
that reads the serial number. It applies its first secret, signing key SKb1 to ξ
to generate the seed value ρ from which it computes the candidate order pi.
It also computes the onion value θ by encrypting the seed value, ρ, with the
public, threshold teller key PKT . The randomisation used in this encryption
is generated by signing ξ with its second secret key SKb2.
It prints the candidates on the LH column of the form in the appropriate
order. On the RH strip it prints the onion value to give a conventional Preˆt
a` Voter form. To facilitate auditing should the form be selected for audit,
we can use a variant of the Adida/Rivest off-line audit mechanism, [2]: the
device prints information to enable checking the well-formedness of ballot
forms selected for audit. We will discuss this in more detail later, for the
moment we denote the audit information by µ. For a form used for voting,
this information will be discarded along with the candidate order, but it will
be preserved on a form destined for audit.
Thus, the seed is computed as:
ρ := {ξ}SKb1 (mod n)
the randomisation factor as:
ζ := {ξ}SKb2 (mod n)
the candidate order as:
pi := σ(ρ)
and finally the onion value:
θ := {ρ, ζ}PKT
The figures illustrate this: Figure 1.5 shows a typical proto-ballot form
bearing only a serial number. Figure 1.6 shows the form after the booth device
has computed and printed the the candidates and audit information µ on the
LH side, and the onion value at the bottom of the RH side.
The generation of the seed and randomisation as deterministic signatures
on the serial number serves to counter kleptographic attacks in which the
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ξ
Fig. 1.5. Proto-ballot form with serial number
Idefix
Asterix
Obelix
Panoramix
µ ξ
Θ
Fig. 1.6. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form showing the onion and audit information
device leaks information over subliminal channels by careful selection of the
seed value, [27]. The proposed mechanism ensures that the device has no
freedom in the choice of the seeds.
Later we will discuss cut-and-choose mechanisms to partition ballot forms
into ones for audit and ones for casting votes.
1.13.2 Distributed generation of Paillier Encrypted Ballot Forms
The disadvantage of the approach above is that the booth device necessar-
ily learns the association of the candidate order and onion value. We could
implement these devices in such a way as to ensure that all information is
erased once the form is printed. However, guaranteeing this may be difficult
and, furthermore, there are dangers of the information being leaked over side-
channels. The construction of this section seeks to address these issues.
The onions are be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way that each
contributes to the entropy of the cryptographic values from which the candi-
date list is derived. Furthermore, these values remain encrypted throughout.
As a result, all the clerks would have to collude to determine the seeds values.
As before, we assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares for
a threshold Paillier algorithm with Teller public key PKT : (g, n). This public
key is known to the Clerks and is used in the construction of the encrypted
ballot forms.
The first clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds s¯0i drawn at random
from Z∗n. From these, C0 generates a batch of initial onions by Paillier en-
crypting each s¯0i under the Teller key:
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E(s¯0i , x0i ) = (gs¯
0
i · (x0i )n) (mod n2)
for fresh random values x¯0i drawn from Z
∗
n.
The remaining l−1 Clerks now perform re-encryption mixes and transfor-
mations on this batch of onions: each Clerk takes the batch of onions output
by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along with an
injection of fresh seed entropy into the seed values. For each onion, the seed
entropy is drawn from Z∗n is injected into the seed value of the onion. The
seed entropy and randomising factors will be independently chosen for each
onion.
More precisely, for ith onion of the j − 1th batch Θj−1i := E(sj−1i , xj−1i ),
the jth Clerk Cj generates fresh, random values x¯
j
i and s¯
j
i ∈ Z∗n and multiplies
Θj−1i by E(s¯ji , x¯ji ):
Θji = E(sji , xji ) = E(sj−1i , xj−1i ) · E(x¯ji , x¯ji ) = E(sj−1i + s¯ji , xj−1i × x¯ji )
where
xji := x
j−1
i × x¯ji (mod n2)
sji := s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i (mod n)
Having transformed each onion in this way, the Clerk Cj then performs a
secret shuffle on the batch and outputs the result to the next Clerk, Cj+1.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of onions of the form:
Θi := E(si, xi) = (αsi · (xi)n) where:
xi = xli and si = s
l
i
si =
l∑
j=0
s¯ji (mod n), xi =
l∏
j=0
x¯ji (mod n
2)
As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain encrypted,
none of clerks knows the final seed values and they would all have to collude to
determine them. These onions can now be stored and distributed in this form,
thus avoiding the chain of custody problems mentioned above. Kleptographic
channels are also avoided as no single entity is able to choose the seed values
in such a way as to leak information.
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1.14 Transforming Receipt Onions into Booth Onions
We could now proceed to use these onions, which we will refer to as receipt
onions, directly in the construction of the ballot forms, much as described
in the previous section. However, we would like to ensure that the booth
device does not learn the value of the onion used in the receipt in order to
avoid a single device knowing the association of receipt onion and candidate
order. To this end we describe a further stage in the construction to create
re-encryptions of these onions that will be available to and decryptable by the
booth device.
We introduce a number of re-encryption clerks and we assume that the
onions created in the previous phase described above have been printed on
proto-ballot forms. That is, each ballot form will have printed on it a unique
onion drawn from the set generated as described above. The first of these
re-encryption clerks takes the batch of such forms and for each performs a re-
encryption of the onion on the form. It then covers the onion with a scratch
strip and overprint this with the re-encrypted onion value. The resulting batch
of forms, now showing only the re-encrypted onion values, is shuffled and
passed on to the next re-encryption clerk who repeats the process. This can
be repeated for as many re-encryptions as we require, depending on how high
we want the collusion threshold to be placed. Just one such re-encryption
might be judged sufficient in some cases.
The upshot of all this is that we have a batch of proto-ballot forms on
each of which is visible only the final (multiply) re-encrypted onion value over-
printed on a (multi-layer) scratch strip. We refer to these uppermost onions
as the booth onions. Under these scratch strips are the receipt onions. The
voting procedure is now as follows: again Anne picks up a form at random
and proceeds to the booth. The scratch strip should be kept intact until the
point at which the ballot is cast. In the booth, the device reads the visible,
booth onion, decrypts it and computes the candidate list. The device prints
the candidate list and audit information on the LH side of the form result-
ing in a conventional Preˆt a` Voter ballot form. Anne fills in her selection,
removes and discards the LH column and leaves the booth. In the presence of
an official, the scratch strip is now removed to reveal the receipt onion (and
in the process destroying the booth onion). Vote casting completes as before.
Note that the use of the scratch strips to conceal the receipt onions also helps
counter chain voting and chain of custody attacks.
An issue that we need to deal with in the above construction, is how the
booth device is to perform the decryption of the onion. A possibility is to have
the tellers available online and have the booth device communicate the onions
value to them to perform partial decryption of onions. We could arrange for
the booth device to hold a share of the key and so perform the final step of
the decryption. Ideally we would like to transform the receipt onions, that
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currently can only be decrypted by a threshold set of the tellers, to a form
that can be decrypted unaided by the booth device, without requiring any
tellers to be available on-line during the voting phase.
To this end, we introduce a further transformation phase in which an
t− 1 subset of the tellers perform partial decryptions with their share of the
teller key, but stopping short of full decryption (which will be performed at
the last moment by the booth device). Here we describe how this can be
accomplished for ElGamal ciphertexts. A similar, but rather more elaborate
construction can be provided for Paillier terms, but we omit the details due
to space constraints.
We assume a Shamir secret sharing scheme with threshold of size t such
that the secret key K is given by K = f(0), where f is a randomly chosen
polynomial of degree t − 1 and ki = f(i) is the share allocated to the i’th
teller. For a set of tellers, with index set S, of size t the secret is given by K =
f(0) =
∑
i∈S µ
S
i · f(i) =
∑
i∈S µ
S
i · ki, where the µ terms are the appropriate
Legendre coefficients for the set S. The tth element of this set will the booth
device.
We progressively decrypt an ElGamal ciphertext (x0; y0) by progressively
factoring out the (xo)µ
S
i ·ki shares from the second y0 term of the ElGamal
ciphertext pair. For i ∈ {1, ...t − 1}, the i’th teller performs the following
partial decryption on the i− 1’th ElGamal term:
Di(x0; yi−1) = (x0, yi) = (x0; yi−1 · (x0)−µi·ki)
We stop short of performing the final, t’th booth decryption so obtaining
the booth onion. The final decryption step will be performed on-demand by
the booth device using its share of the key:
Dt(x0; yt−1) = ρi = yt−1 · (x0)−µt·kt
1.15 Auditing “on-demand” Ballot Forms
The mechanisms described above allow for the on-demand printing of ballot
forms in the booth. This has advantages in terms of removing the need to
trust a single entity to keep the ballot form information secret and avoids
chain of custody issues. On the other hand, it means that we can no longer
use pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms. Given that we want to avoid
having to trust the device in the booth, we must introduce alternative tech-
niques to detect and deter any corruption or malfunction in the creation of
the ballot forms. To address this we introduce a cut-and-choose element into
the protocol.
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To this end, voters could be furnished with two or perhaps more encrypted
ballot forms. For each of these, the booth device decrypts the onion, computes
the candidate order and prints this on the form. The voter selects one at
random to cast her vote: the others will be audited and discarded. Care must
be taken to avoid introducing dangers of double voting or chain voting etc.
Double voting is probably fairly easily countered by the supervised casting of
ballot receipts in the presence of officials who ensure that only one form is
cast and the voter’s name is marked as having voted.
Chain voting threats might be a little more delicate to counter: here a
malicious voter, Yves, secretes a decrypted ballot form and smuggles it out
of the polling station. Yves marks this form with the candidate of his choice
and passes it to another voter who is required to cast their vote using this
form. Yves can subsequently check whether the voter complied by checking
the WBB. Keeping a log of serial numbers issued to a voter, in the manner of
known counters to chain voting [23], would help here. If we employ the scratch
strip technique of Section 1.13.2, this has the effect of concealing the receipt
onion value and so thwarting chain voting attacks. The receipt onion would
only be revealed at the time of casting the ballot and verified in the presence
of officials.
The double sided forms of [31] provide a mechanism to keep a clear ac-
count of the distribution of ballot forms. Here, each side of a form carries an
independent onion. For each side, the onion is decrypted and the candidate
order printed. This results in two independent Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms being
printed, one on each side of the form. The voter arbitrarily selects one side to
vote and the other for audit. The forms actually have a third, blank column
opposite the candidate list on the other side, as shown in figures 1.7 and 1.8.
Thus, detaching the candidate list on the voted side detaches the blank col-
umn of the flip side, so leaving an intact form for audit. The two sides of the
resulting receipt where the voter has cast a vote for Asterix on the second
side is shown in figures 1.9 and 1.10.
Obelix
Asterix
Idefix
Panoramix
499052712 7rJ94K
Fig. 1.7. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form; side 1
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Obelix
Asterix
Idefix
Panoramix
499052712 Y u78gf
Fig. 1.8. Dual Preˆt a` Voter ballot form; side 2
Obelix
Asterix
Idefix
Panoramix
499052712 7rJ94K
Fig. 1.9. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt; auditable side
X
Y u78gf
Fig. 1.10. Dual Preˆt a` Voter receipt; vote carrying side
1.16 Checking the Construction of the Ballot Forms
Using Paillier encryption suggests alternative techniques to demonstrate cor-
rectness of the construction of audited forms. If we use the on-demand genera-
tion of seeds and randomisation described in Section 1.13.1, the booth device
will know randomisation and can either reveal it for audit purposes or to
construct a ZK proof. Alternatively, if we use pre-prepared onions, the booth
device will not immediately know the randomisation. However, Damg˚ard et al,
[11], show that for Paillier, knowledge of the secret key allows recovery of the
randomisation. This rather remarkable fact about Paillier encryption seems
to be surprisingly little known. The Damg˚ard et al paper actually gives the
results for their generalisation of Paillier to modulo ns+1, but for simplicity
of presentation we give the result for Paillier’s original modulo n2 version of
the algorithm.
Suppose that the decryption teller P is given a ciphertext c = gm · rn
(mod n2). He recovers the plaintext m from which he can compute g−m
(mod n2) and can extract can extract randomisation term: rn = c · g−m
(mod n2). Now P needs to take the n’th root of this term. He computes a
value a such that a · λ+ 1 = 0 (mod n) and then computes:
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(rn)
a·λ+1
n (mod n) = ra·λ+1 (mod n) = r (mod n)
We observe that to extract the randomisation factor does not in fact re-
quire knowledge of λ but only of the value η := (a · λ + 1)/n. Furthermore,
knowledge of η does not entail knowledge of λ. As a result we can safely allow
the official auditing devices to know η to enable them to extract the randomi-
sation factor and use this along with the seed value revealed by the booth
device to check the well-formedness of the audit form.
A few remarks are in order here. Firstly, if the threshold schemes was set
up by a dealer who distributed the shares to the tellers, then the dealer can
compute η. However, we may prefer to avoid having a dealer know λ and so
would use a distributed scheme to set up the shares in such a way as no single
entity knows λ. In this case it is not so clear how η can be computed. This
will be investigated in a forthcoming paper.
Another issue is that printing the audit information on the LH column of
the forms may undermine the decoy strip mechanism by creating a verifiable
link between the LH and RH columns. If we arrange for the randomisation
factor to be only recoverable by the official auditing devices at the time of
casting, then this lessens the danger of links being established between the LH
and RH strips of ballot forms used to cast votes. In fact, we could arrange for
the booth device to print an encryption of the seed value under a public key
for the official audit devices. The official audit devices would then be required
to print the revealed seed and randomisation value on audit forms so that the
checks can be independently verified.
Ballot forms could be audited at several points in the process. A first check
would be performed at the time of casting the receipt: official auditing devices
would be available at the registration desk. If we have used the distributed
construction of receipt and booth onions, then for any given form, the booth
and receipt onions should have the same seed value but different randomisa-
tions. Thus the official audit device is able to directly audit the correctness
of the receipt onion w.r.t. the candidate order shown using the seed value
revealed by the booth and the randomisation recovered using knowledge of η.
As we don’t want to trust the official audit devices we introduce voter
helper organisations, [3]: representatives of the various parties etc. provide
auditing devices at the polling stations so that further, independent checks
can be performed just after casting their receipt. These audit devices could
also check the validity of the digital signatures applied at the time of casting.
Additionally, auditing could take place on material posted to the WBB.
All the information on both sides of the receipts would be posted. The voted
and auditable sides should be posted to separate regions of the WBB in such a
way as to loose any association between the two sides. The voted sides would
be processed via the tabulation mixes whilst the auditable sides are available
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to be verified by anyone. Note that, in principle, anyone can write an auditing
program: the algorithms are all public and indeed quite standard.
Audit forms posted to the WBB could themselves be decrypted by the
tellers in a sort of tabulation mix, except that here we would carry the candi-
date order through the mix and check that the order computed on decryption
of seed matches. This strategy avoids any need to reveal audit information
and it might be tempting to adopt it as the sole ballot auditing mechanism.
In practice, it is probably preferable to use it as a supplementary mechanism
to provide added assurance, as corruption would be detected very late in the
process. Audit forms could be required to carry booth identifiers so that any
corruption detected can be traced back to the offending booth device and
isolated.
1.17 Re-encryption/Tabulation Mixes
Paillier encrypted terms can be put through a conventional re-encryption mix,
but Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipts do not have the form of straight Paillier
encrypted terms, so they cannot be treated quite so straightforwardly. In
addition to the onion term we have the index value, in the clear as it were.
An obvious approach would be to send the receipt terms through the mix re-
encrypting the onions whilst leaving the index values unchanged. The problem
with this is that an adversary is able to partition the mix according to the
index values. There may be situations in which this is acceptable, for example
large elections in which the number of voters vastly exceeds the number of
voting options. In general this seems unsatisfactory.
A more satisfactory solution, at least for the case of a simple selection of
one candidate from the list, is described here. In this case we restrict ourselves
to simple cyclic shifts from the base ordering of the candidates. For single
candidate choice voting this is sufficient to ensure that the receipts do not
reveal the voter’s selection. For more general styles of election, for example in
which voters are required to indicate a ranking of the candidates, we of course
need to allow full permutations of the candidate list. We will discuss how to
achieve full mixing in the more general case in Section 1.18 .
Suppose that s is the seed for the a given ballot form and ν is the number of
candidates, then we can simply let s (mod ν) be the shift of the candidate
list. We can absorb the index value ι on the ballot receipt into the Pailler
onion:
{ι, (α−s.yn)} → (αι.α−s.yn) = (αι−s.yn)
Note that, for convenience, we encrypt −s rather than s. This gives a pure
Paillier encryption of the value ι− s which, taken modulo ν, gives the voter’s
original candidate choice in the canonical base ordering. These pure Paillier
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terms can now be sent through a conventional re-encryption mix as described
earlier.
1.18 Handling Full Permutations and STV Style
Elections
Handling full permutations of the candidate list is straightforward in the 2005
version of Preˆt a` Voterthat uses RSA onions and decryption mixes [8]. The
permutation of the candidates shown on the original ballot form is built up as
the product of permutations derived from seed values buried in each layer of
the onion. During the tabulation mix, as we reveal a new seed value at each
stage of the mix, we simply apply the inverse permutation derived from this
seed. As long as we arrange for these inverse permutations to be applied in the
reverse order we undo the effect of the permutation applied in the construction
of the ballot form. The overall effect is to output the indices (or rank vectors)
in the canonical, base ordering, [8].
In order to deal with full permutations of the candidate list where ran-
domising encryptions and re-encryption mixes are used, it is not immediately
clear how to generalise the approach of Section 1.17. One solution is sim-
ply to have one onion against each candidate, encrypting the corresponding
candidate code. For a single candidate selection, the ballot receipt would in
effect simply be the onion value against the chosen candidate. This feels rather
inelegant and inefficient in that it multiplies the number of onions required.
A rather neat way to deal with ranked, STV style, ballots, due to Heather
[20], works as follows. Ballot receipts are formed as vectors of pairs compris-
ing a rank value and an onion encrypting a candidate index. These receipts
are posted as usual and can be checked as before. Before mixing starts, we
introduce an initial normalising step in which each ballot vector is re-ordered
into rank order. Once this is done, the ranking can be dropped and the ballots
are sent through re-encryption mixes as tuples of onions.
Thus, for example, a ballot vector:
{(3, Θ1), (1, Θ2), (4, Θ3), (2, Θ4)}
would be normalised to:
{(1, Θ2), (2, Θ4), (3, Θ1), (4, Θ3)}
and then to:
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{(Θ2), (Θ4), (Θ1), (Θ3)}
These ballot vectors are now fed into a sequence of re-encryption mixes in
which each onion is independently re-encrypted but the the vector composition
is preserved. Thus, the tuple above would be transformed to:
{(Θ′2), (Θ′4), (Θ′1), (Θ′3)}
Where the prime indicates re-encryption and Θi denotes an onion en-
crypting the index of candidate i. Once the ballots have gone through an
appropriate number of re-encryption mixes, we move to the decryption phase.
Now we can adopt a lazy decryption strategy: firstly we just decrypt the top,
ranked first, onions for each vector and perform the first phase of the STV
counting. When votes are transferred from eliminated candidates, the list of
onions in a vector are rotated so that the second onion goes to the top of the
list whilst the previously top vote is encrypted and drops down to the bottom
of the list. Thus, the vector above might be partially decrypted to:
{Candidate2, (Θ4), (Θ1), (Θ3)}
and, on transfer transformed to:
{(Θ′4), (Θ′1), (Θ′3), (Θ′2)}
We only decrypt lower ranked onions as required by the counting, and
typically we will need only to decrypt a few orders of the ranking before the
counting process terminates. The transfer history of a vote is thus completely
concealed, so countering “Italian” style attacks, in which a coercer requires a
voter to use a certain identifying pattern in his low order rankings to prove
how he voted. Where voters have not filled in all lower rankings, the remaining
onions are simply inserted in the vector in the random order of the ballot form.
1.19 Remote Voting
The schemes that we have discussed so far are all supervised: voting takes
place in a controlled environment such as a polling station and the casting of
the vote occurs in the enforced isolation of a polling booth.
In remote systems, voters are able to cast their vote over a suitable channel,
e.g: postal, internet, telephone, interactive TV etc. Here, the isolation of the
voter whilst casting their vote cannot be enforced and the threats of vote
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buying or coercion are consequently much more serious. It is sometimes argued
that the difficulty in ensuring coercion-resistance is enough to render remote
voting inadmissible.
To implement a scheme satisfying coercion-resistance, it is necessary to
assume at least one step in the interaction that cannot be observed by the
coercer, otherwise the voter and coercer would be indistinguishable to the
system. Clarkson et al [10] have devised a remote implementation of Preˆt a`
Voter with increased resistance to coercion, based on an approach of Juels at
el [24]. Voters are issued with tokens that look like random streams but are
actually encryptions of a “valid” string. Ordinarily, a voter casts their vote
along with their token. If threatened by a coercer, they can corrupt the token
in the knowledge that this will not be recorded as a valid vote. The voter can
then recast their vote at some other time using their valid token. Valid tokens,
and hence associated votes, are only identified during the tabulation phase,
after anonymisation mixes. The coercer has no way to distinguish between
valid and invalid vote.
Coming up with a way to assure voters that they have been provided with
a valid token in such a way that this assurance cannot be transferred to a
third party remains an open question, at least if we want to do this in a way
that does not require vesting trust in some token distribution entity. Even if
we suppose that a technical solution to this could be found, there remains
that matter of public trust in such a mechanism. If voters do not believe in
the mechanism they will again be open coercion.
1.20 Conclusions
Confidence in voting systems, particularly electronic systems, has been severely
shaken in recent years by, most notably, the debacles in the 2000 and 2004
US presidential elections. It is rather troubling that the nation that proclaims
itself the most technologically advanced and the torchbearer for democracy
can make such an utter hash of voting technology. Many activists point to
the evident deficiencies of many of the existing voting technologies and from
this conclude that all voting technology must be deficient and go on to ad-
vocate a return to good old fashioned pencil and paper ballots along with
hand counting. Whilst the critiques of most current voting technologies are
certainly valid, to condemn all voting technology as a result is not a valid
inference. And of course, pencil and paper is not immune to corruption.
In this chapter I have described an alternative response, based on systems
providing transparency and auditability. Significant strides have been made
of late towards voting systems that are trustworthy and yet sufficiently simple
to be usable and to gain the confidence of the electorate. These end-to-end
systems strive to avoid the need to place trust in devices, software, processes
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or officials. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of the system ultimately rests
with the electorate themselves.
I have presented the key ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme and its
key properties. I have also described some of the known threats against such
schemes and gone on to present some enhancements to the basic scheme that
counter these threats. Arguably some of these threats are somewhat exotic
and so the additional complexity of the enhanced versions might not be on
balance be worthwhile, at least in some contexts.
There is doubtless scope for further innovations and simplifications of these
schemes. More analysis of these schemes is required, and such analysis will
have to be extended to a full systems-based approach taking account of the
surrounding socio-technical system. Whilst such schemes appear to provide
high levels of trustworthiness, at least in the eyes of experts, it is not clear
that the public at large would understand and appreciate the rather subtle
arguments and so be prepared to trust in them to the same extent as, say,
familiar pen and paper systems. This leads us to some delicate socio-technical
questions:
• To what extent can the properties of cryptographic systems be explained
to the general public?
• To what extent is it necessary for the general public to understand in order
to have sufficient trust in such systems?
• To what extent are the assurances of independent, impartial experts
enough to engender trust?
• To what extent might it be necessary to compromise on trustworthiness in
order to achieve understandability by, for example, replacing cryptographic
mechanisms with simpler technology or processes? [31].
Somewhat paradoxically, the very transparency and auditability of the
scheme may be an obstacle: the fact that errors and corruption can be de-
tected, and in practice presumably errors will occur, may damage confidence.
In conventional systems, most errors go undetected and, if detected, are han-
dled quietly behind the scenes. This is a rather delicate issue, probably best
addressed by those better qualified.
Another area that has seen very little exploration to date is that of effective
recovery strategies. Verifiable schemes define mechanisms for detecting errors
or corruption, but typically say little about how to respond when errors are
detected. Clearly we do not want to abort an election if only a smattering of
errors are detected, especially if these are negligible compared to the margin
of the count. Where should the thresholds be placed at which recovery actions
are be triggered and what are the appropriate response strategies?
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I hope that this chapter has helped put the case for high assurance schemes
like Preˆt a` Voter. Such schemes can provide far higher levels of assurance
than traditional pen and paper and with much lower dependence on software,
hardware, processes and officials and as such have the potential to help restore
confidence on the processes of democracy.
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